Real-time encryption and authentication of medical video streams on FPGA by Vliegen, Jo et al.
Real-time encryption and authentication of medical
video streams on FPGA
Jo Vliegen∗†, Bob Koninckx‡, Dave Singele´e∗, Nele Mentens∗†
∗KU Leuven, iMinds, COSIC, Leuven, Belgium
†KU Leuven, ES&S, Technology Campus Diepenbeek, Belgium
‡eSATURNUS, Leuven, Belgium
Abstract—This work presents an FPGA-based solution for the
encryption and authentication of video streams of surgeries. The
most important is minimal latency. To achieve this, a block cipher
with an authenticated mode of operation is used. We choose
to use AES128 with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), because the
this mode of operation is patent-free and it allows for random
read access. This solution minimizes the overhead on the existing
critical path to a single XOR operation.
Our solution supports the broadcasting of the video stream.
When a new receiver announces itself, it should receive the active
keys of the sender. Therefore, a key transport protocol is used to
establish a key between the sender and the announcing receiver.
A proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed solution
has been implemented and tested. While the complete video
stream is encrypted and authenticated, the demonstrator con-
firms that the added latency, which is around 23 µs, could not
be noticed by the human eye. Random read access and the key
establishment protocol provide a flexible solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is evermore present in our daily lives. This
work contributes in the efforts of using the Internet for broad-
casting surgeries. In an operating room more and more flat
screens are used to provide the surgeon with vital information
coming from an endoscope, a heart monitor, blood pressure
levels and many more sources. We consider a setup that gathers
all video input streams on the sender device, sends the data
over Gigabit Ethernet to the receiver device, and makes this
video stream available for the most frequently used video
interfaces. The latency of the video stream in this setting is
of the utmost importance because this video stream could be
the only feedback an operating surgeon gets.
Given the network link between both devices, these devices
can be placed anywhere in the world as long as both can
be provided with a decent Internet connection. The proof-of-
concept solution presented in this work handles the necessary
encryption and authentication challenges. Moreover, in Eu-
rope, article 17 in directive 95/46/EU [1] states that adding
encryption and authentication is legally required when data is
transmitted over a network, .
By physically moving the receiving device to another lo-
cation on earth additional features can be achieved. Firstly,
it would allow other surgeons to virtually attend the surgery.
This could be helpful when dealing with difficult operations.
Next to other surgeons, also medical students could follow
an operation for educational purposes. A second additional
feature is to have a trusted party record the surgery. A
verifiable authenticated video stream could also be used for
legal purposes.
The extended setup of the project setting is visualised in
Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The extended setup with physically separated sender and receiver
devices
On the left hand side of Fig. 1 the operating surgeon
is shown. The yellow box represents the video stream that
is captured. Subsequently, the stream gets encrypted and
authenticated which is represented by the red box. These data
are then broadcast and fed back locally after which, on either
side, the stream is decrypted and authenticated.
The remainder of this paper first describes the chosen
protocol and the algorithms in Sect. II. Subsequently, the
architecture and the network protocol are discussed in Sect. III,
after which the implementation and the results of the proof-
of-concept implementation are explained in detail in Sect. IV.
Finally, conclusion are drawn in Sect. V.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL AND ALGORITHMS
A. Protocol
With two devices communicating with each other, a protocol
has be installed. This protocol has to satisfy two requirements:
• a viewer of the video stream can start viewing at any
given point in time (REQ.1);
• the maximum duration of a stream is set to 10h (REQ.2);
• the video stream needs to be confidential (REQ.3);
• the video stream needs to be authenticated (REQ.4).
Because the sending device is highly likely to broadcast to
multiple receiving devices a key transport protocol (KTP) is
chosen in favour of a key establishment protocol. In the former
a single key is determined by the sending device, whereas with
the latter a different key with every receiving device needs to
be established. A KTP is chosen to prevent the sender from
encrypting and authenticating the same video stream multiple
times.
The session keys which are used for a single surgery are
generated by the sending device. When a new receiver device
presents itself, the active keys need to be transported from
the sending to the receiving device. The used protocol is the
“Encrypting signed keys” protocol [2] and is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
THE “ENCRYPTING SIGNED KEYS” PROTOCOL AS DEFINED IN [2]
Sending device Receiving device
key pair (a,A) key pair (b, B)
A
m1 =viewing request ||B
m1
←
choose k
m2 = k || t∗
m3 = Sa(B ||m2)
m2 ||m3
→
verify m3 with A
Ksession = k = k1 || k2 Ksession = k = k1 || k2
mx = MACk2 (data)
my = Ek1 (data ||mx)
my
→
Dk1 (my) = data
′ ||m′x
verify m′x
key pair (x,X) : x and X are the private and public key, respectively
|| : concatenation of messages
t: timestamp
∗: indicates this is optional
Sk(m): digital signature on m with key k
MACk(m): MAC on m with key k
Ek(m): encryption of m with key k
Dk(m): decryption of m with key k
With this protocol in place REQ.1 is partially met. Given
that the network runs at Gigabit speed, broadcasting for 10h
would end up with a total amount of data of 36 ∗ 1012 bits.
When a 128-bit block cipher is chosen, this total number of
bits is smaller than 2128/2. Therefor no re-keying is necessary
during a single broadcast session, meeting REQ.2,
Using the “Encrypting signed keys” protocol, both types
of audiences (being colleague surgeons and class rooms) can
attend a surgery-broadcast. For the recorder type of audience,
the first phase would be identical. When a broadcast is fin-
ished, a recorder can use its own private key (from a different
public key pair) to sign the complete received video stream.
This signature cannot be generated by the sender because there
is always the possibility that certain frames do not make it
across the Internet, or that they are corrupted on the way. The
signature on the video stream by a trusted recorder could be
used in a legal setting to prove the authenticity of a recording.
Through a public-key infrastructure the complexity is flexible
with respect to size.
With the session key safely established the communication
can occur encrypted (REQ.3) and authenticated (REQ.4).
B. Algorithms
With authenticated encryption being around for more than a
decade, it needs no further argumentation that choosing such
an algorithm fits the obtained goal. Bellare and Namprem-
pre [3] have shown that Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) provides
the best security, assuming that the MAC is strongly unforge-
able. The authenticated encryption algorithm used in [3] is
GCM [4]. The underlying block cipher is AES [5] with a
128-bit key, and the authentication algorithm is GMAC [4].
GCM allows for random read access so a receiver can join the
stream at any point in time. Moreover, when network frames
get lost this will not break the decryption and authentication
of the following network frames. This, in combination with
the choice of the protocol in Sec. II-A, assures that REQ.1 is
completely met. An additional argument for choosing GCM
is the fact that GCM is unencumbered by patents.
III. ARCHITECTURE AND NETWORK PROTOCOL
A. Architecture
As stated above, the existing product consists out of a
sending and receiving device which communicate over a
Gigabit network. During initialisation this connection is used
by a microprocessor for the key establishment protocol and
(for the receiver) to obtain the session key which is partially
used for encryption and partially for authentication. These keys
are then handed over to the hardware for operational use.
Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of the architecture of the
GCM core. The actual implementations for sender and receiver
slightly differ. The main difference is that the receiver has a
comparator which verifies that the generated MAC matches
the received MAC; and the receiver has additional glue logic
to get the counter value, present as authenticated plain text,
out of the network header frame.
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the architecture of the GCM core
The block diagram of Fig. 2 is implemented for both the
sender and the receiver. Due to reasons explained above, the
size of the receiving device is larger than the size of the
sending device.
B. Network protocol
The existing product uses the standardised TCP/IPv4 proto-
cols. With the addition of encryption and authentication, every
network frame that is broadcast must include a plain text field
containing the counter value of the GCM mode. This field
needs to be in plain text, but it should also be authenticated
so modifications to this counter value, both accidental and
intentional, will be noticed.
With every new network frame, this counter field is pro-
cessed as authenticated data. Hereafter the remainder of the
frame is filled with raw video data which is encrypted and
authenticated. In a real setting, encoding techniques need to
be applied to increase efficiency, but this is out of scope for
this proof-of-concept implementation.
When considering a default network setting, the maximum
packet size is 1’518 bytes of which 58 bytes are typically
used for multiple protocol headers (14 bytes Ethernet header,
20 bytes IPv4 header, 20 bytes TCP header, and 4 bytes of
CRC). This leaves 1’460 bytes for video data of which 16
bytes are assumed to be authenticated data (the counter value
of GCM) and another 16 bytes are reserved for the MAC. This
leaves 1’428 bytes for the video data which translates to 89
blocks of 16 bytes. This encapsulation is shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Network encapsulation of the video stream
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
To control the GCM core shown in Fig. 2, four commands
are implemented. The first command (‘init’) is used to set the
Internal Value and to initialise the control path. Subsequently,
the GCM core can process one or more blocks of authen-
ticated data, instructed with the command ‘a’. As explained
in Sec. III-B, 16 bytes are authenticated. The GCM core can
then process one or more 16-byte blocks of data that needs to
be authenticated and encrypted (‘ae’). Finally, the GCM core
processes the lengths fields (which indicate the length of the
authenticated data and the encrypted-and-authenticated data,
respectively) in order to calculate the MAC (‘f’).
The number of occupied slices for the sender is 1’442 and
that of the receiver is 1’918 slices. Note that these numbers
cannot be compared directly. The sender is implemented on a
Xilinx ML507 development board which contains a Virtex 5
FPGA, while the receiver is implemented on a Xilinx ML605
development board which contains a Virtex 6 FPGA.
Table II summarises the results with respect to latency
assuming the component is running with a 125 MHz clock
which is used by Gigabit network devices.
command init a ae f Σ
# clock cycles 13 5 16 14
latency unit [ns] 104 40 128 112
latency fnf [ns] 104 80 11’264 112 11’560
TABLE II
THE NETWORK LATENCY ON A DEFAULT NETWORK, WHERE FNF STANDS
FOR FULL NETWORK FRAME
According to Miller [6] a latency of 100 ms (or less) is
perceived as instantaneous. The solution provided in this paper
introduces an overhead of 23.2 µs, which, which is negligible
with respect to the 100 ms. Therefor the operating surgeon
will not notice the additional overhead.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work presents a solution for FPGA-based encryption
and authentication for video streaming of surgeries. The choice
of the cryptographic protocol (“Encrypting signed keys”)
together with the used algorithms (GCM with AES128) are
explained and detailed discussions on the implementation and
the network protocol are provided.
The additional latency due to encryption and authentication
is kept to a minimum and is visually not detectable with an
increase in latency of 23 µs.
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